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SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 22 августа 1939
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 августа 1939
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"Ужасный пакт Молотова-Риббентропа", который, как сейчас уверяют наши либералы, стал главной причиной разязывания Второй мировой войны, в момент своего появления никак не рассматривался западной прессой таковым - может быть сенсация, но никак не катастрофа.
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Его значение, и вообще роль СССР в тех событиях, было крайне преувеличено задним числом. Такой вывод можно сделать, в частности, из рассмотрения тогдашней британской дипломатической переписки и иных документов, касающейся ситуации в Польше, где СССР упоминается крайне редко.
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В сотне британских документов весны-лета 1939 года
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subj...nus/blbkmenu.asp
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/tp.asp
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THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939)
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939
Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty
Digital Version Published by Permission of Her Majesty's Government. Decemeber 1997
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СССР упоминается всего несколько раз.
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В частности, министр иностранных дел Галифакс 29 июня мельком упомянул об англо-франко-советских переговорах
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk25.asp
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Chatham House on June 29, 1939
"we are now engaged with the Soviet Government in a negotiation, to which I hope there may very shortly be a successful issue, with a view to associating them with us for the defence of States in Europe whose independence and neutrality may be threatened".
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Основное внимание британцы уделяли кризису вокруг Данцига (причем они никогда не называли его Гданьском!) и серьезно рассматривали возможность того что либо местные власти организуют там путч и присоединятся к Германии в одностороннем порядке, либо сама Германия начнет войну с Польшей - и это было еще до заключения "пакта". Причем влияние позиции СССР на действия Германии в этих документах вообще никак британцами не учитывалось.
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Британцы знали о советско-германских переговорах и еще до их завершения, 22 августа, Чемберлен уведомил Гитлера, что их результат никак не повлияет на позицию Великобритании в отношении гарантий Польше
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk56.asp
Letter of August 22, 1939, from the Prime Minister to the German Chancellor
"These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil."
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24 августа Чемберлен в выступлении в Палате общин и Галифакс в выступлении в Палате лордов практически в одних и тех же словах сообщили о заключении советско-германского договора и о том что он не повлиял на позицию Великобритании. О какой-то катастрофе и неизбежности начала войны ничего сказано не было.
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk64.asp
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 24, 1939
"That was the situation on Tuesday last, when in Berlin and Moscow it was announced that negotiations had been taking place, and were likely soon to be concluded, for a non-aggression pact between those two countries. I do not attempt to conceal from the House that that announcement came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a very unpleasant character. For some time past there had been rumours about an impending change in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, but no inkling of that change had been conveyed either to us or to the French Government by the Soviet Government. The House may remember that on the 31st July I remarked that we had engaged upon steps almost unprecedented in character. I said that we had shown a great amount of trust and a strong desire to bring the negotiations with the Soviet Union to a successful conclusion when we agreed to send our soldiers, sailors and airmen to Russia to discuss military plans together before we had any assurance that we should be able to reach an agreement on political matters. Well, Sir, nevertheless, moved by the observation of the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that if we could come to a successful conclusion of our military discussions, political agreement should not present any insuperable difficulties, we sent the Mission.
The British and French Missions reached Moscow on the 11th August. They were warmly received, in friendly fashion, and discussions were actually in progress and had proceeded on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung down. It, to say the least of it, was highly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were proceeding on that basis, the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects of their foreign policy, as we had understood it. I do not propose this afternoon to pass any final judgment upon this incident. That, I think, would be premature until we have had an opportunity of consulting with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of this agreement, the text of which was published only this morning. But the question that the Government had to consider when they learned of this announcement was what effect, if any, this changed situation would have upon their own policy. In Berlin the announcement was hailed, with extraordinary cynicism, as a great diplomatic victory which removed any danger of war, since we and France would no longer be likely to fulfil our obligations to Poland. We felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion.
The House will recollect that the guarantee which we had given to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was talked of, and that it was not in any way made dependent upon any such agreement being reached. How, then, could we, with honour, go back upon such an obligation, which we had so often and so plainly repeated? Therefore, our first act was to issue a statement that our obligations to Poland and to other countries remained unaffected. Those obligations rest upon agreed statements made to the House of Commons, to which effect is being given in treaties which are at present in an advanced stage of negotiation. Those treaties, when concluded, will formally define our obligations, but they do not in any way alter, they do not add to or subtract from, the obligations of mutual assistance which have already been accepted.
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In view of the attitude in Berlin to which I have already referred, His Majesty's Government felt that it was their duty at this moment to leave no possible loophole for misunderstanding, and so that no doubt might exist in the mind of the German Government, His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to seek an interview with the German Chancellor and to hand him a message from me on behalf of the British Government. That message was delivered yesterday and the reply was received today. The object of my communication to the German Chancellor was to restate our position and to make quite sure that there was no misunderstanding. His Majesty's Government felt that this was all the more necessary having regard to reports which we had received as to the military movements taking place in Germany and as to the then projected German-Soviet Agreement. I therefore made it plain, as had been done in the communiqué issued after the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, that if the case should arise His Majesty's Government were resolved and prepared to employ without delay all the forces at their command."
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk65.asp
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords on August 24, 1939
"That, in outline, was the situation when on the 22d August, the day before yesterday, it was officially stated in Berlin and Moscow that negotiations had been in progress, and were to be at once continued, for the signature of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. I do not conceal the fact that this announcement came as a surprise to His Majesty's Government. For some time past there had been rumours of a change in the relations between the German and Soviet Governments, but no hint of such a change was conveyed by the Soviet Government to His Majesty's Government or the French Government, with whom they were in negotiation; and on the 31st July last the Prime Minister remarked in another place that His Majesty's Government were showing a great degree of trust, and a strong desire to bring their negotiations with the Soviet Government to a successful issue, when, before any agreement had been finally reached on political matters, they agreed to send a Military Mission to Moscow to discuss military plans. The Military Missions of France and this country reached Moscow on the 11th August, and the conversations were proceeding to all appearance on a basis of mutual confidence, and it is, I do not conceal from your Lordships, certainly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were taking place the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects, as we had understood them, of their foreign policy.
I would not now pass any final judgment on this matter. That would be premature until we have had time to consult with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of the agreement, the actual text of which has been published this morning, but one matter forces itself upon the immediate attention of His Majesty's Government. They had to consider what effect this changed situation should have on their policy. In Berlin the agreement was somewhat cynically welcomed as a great diplomatic victory which removed the danger of war, since, so it was alleged, Great Britain and France would no longer fulfil their obligations to Poland, and His Majesty's Government felt it their first duty to remove this dangerous illusion. It should be recalled, if it is not in mind, that our guarantee to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was in prospect, and without condition that such agreement should be reached. His Majesty's Government therefore at once issued a statement that their obligations to Poland and other countries remained unaffected; and throughout these days, as noble Lords will imagine, we have been in close and constant contact with the French Government, whose attitude is identical with our own. Our obligations rest on the agreed statements which were made in this House and in another place, and which are binding. Effect is being given to them in treaties, which are in an advanced stage of negotiation, and these treaties will formally define the mutual obligations of the parties, but they neither add to nor subtract from the obligations of mutual assistance which have been already accepted."
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Британский посол в Лондоне поставил об этом Гитлера в известность 25 августа
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk69.asp
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 25, 1939
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"Conversation lasted an hour, my attitude being that Russian Pact in no way altered standpoint of His Majesty's Government, and that I must tell him quite honestly that Britain could not go back on her word to Poland and that I knew his offer would not be considered unless it meant a negotiated settlement of the Polish question."
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В оставшуюся до начала войны неделю СССР упоминается в документах только в части привлечения его к переговорам о судьбе Данцига и "коридора", на что Британия дает согласие.
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk78.asp
Reply of the German Chancellor to the Communication of August 28, 1939, from His Majesty's Government.
This reply was handed to Sir N. Henderson by Herr Hitler during the evening of August 29, 1939
"The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith."
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk89.asp
Reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Chancellor's Communication of August 29, 1939.
This reply was handed by Sir N. Henderson to Herr von Ribbentrop at Midnight on August 30, 1939.
"His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made the subject of an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the Guarantee His Majesty's Government have always assumed."
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk98.asp
Message which was communicated to H.M. Ambassador in Berlin by the State Secretary on August 31, 1939, at 9:15 p. m.
"These considerations lead to the following practical proposals:
(1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German Reich in view of its purely German character, as well as of the unanimous will of its population;
(2) The territory of the so-called Corridor which extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromb erg (inclusive) and thence may run in a westerly direction to Schönlanke, shall itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or Poland;
(3) For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on the 1st January, 1918, or who by that date have been born there, and similarly of Poles, Kashubes, &c., domiciled in this territory on the above day (the 1st January, 1918) or born there up to that date. The Germans who have been driven from this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their vote with a view to ensuring an objective plebiscite, and also with a view to ensuring the extensive preparation necessary therefor. The above territory shall, as in the case of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision of an international commission to be formed immediately, on which shall be represented the four Great Powers - Italy, the Soviet Union, France and England. This commission shall exercise all the rights of sovereignty in this territory. With this end in view, the territory shall be evacuated within a period of the utmost brevity, still to be agreed upon, by the Polish armed forces, the Polish police, and the Polish authorities;
..."
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Позволительно спросить - если роль и вина Советского Союза, и "лично товарища Сталина", в последующих печальных событиях были так велики, то почему им тогда не уделялось большого внимания?
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Кстати, по поводу "пакта" были тогда самые разные оценки
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(Отредактировано автором: 2 сентября 2019 — 10:54)
Военно-исторический форум Military. История России. Военная история. Древний мир и Средние века » История войн » Военная история » Межвоенный период (Модераторы: Стас1973, Иммельман, Гот)
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